

JELENA KRGOVIĆ

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EXPERIENCE

2016-2017 **Western Connecticut State University**, Assistant Professor *Danbury, CT*
Philosophy and Humanities Department

EDUCATION

2010–2016 **University at Buffalo, The State University of New York** *Buffalo, NY*

- PhD, Philosophy Department
- Dissertation: *Existential Psychoanalysis and the Nature of Mental Illness*
Dissertation Director: James Lawler
Other Committee Members: Richard Cohen, David Hershenov
Dissertation defended with Distinction on April 8th, 2016

2000 – 2006 **University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy** *Belgrade, Serbia*

- Diplomatus Philosophiae (MA equivalent)

1998 – 2000 **Red Cross Nordic, United World College** *Oslo, Norway*

- International Baccalaureate (I.B.) Diploma

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

- Philosophy of Medicine and Psychiatry, Existential Psychoanalysis, Sartre

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

- Bioethics, Philosophy of Science, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Logic, Phenomenology, Ancient Philosophy

PUBLICATIONS

- “A Sartrean Account of Mental Health”, *Theoria*, 60 (3): pp. 17-31. Serbian Philosophical Society. Belgrade, Serbia. 2017

AFFILIATIONS

Fellow at Romanell Centre for Clinical Ethics and Philosophy of Medicine, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 2017-

REFEREED TALKS

- "Delusion, belief and the imaginary", Evidence and Imagination conference, University of Graz, Austria, November 3-5th, 2016 (accepted)
- “A Sartrean Account of Mental Health”, Philosophies of the Person: New Horizons and Perspectives, St. John’s University, York, England, 21-23 June, 2016 (accepted)
- "Defining mental Illness", 17th International Conference on Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology: Why do humans become mentally ill? Anthropological, biological and cultural vulnerabilities of mental illness, Teatro del Lago, Frutillar, Chile 29-31 October 2015.
- “Magic and Intelligibility”, Thinking with Sartre Today Conference at Maison Française d’Oxford, Oxford University, UK, January 30-31, 2015
- “Mental Disorder: Between the Medical Model and Anti-Psychiatry”, (poster presentation), Conference in

Philosophy of Psychiatry, Pittsburgh, November 20-21, 2014 (accepted)

- “Psychopaths and Foundation of Morality”, 40th Conference on Value Inquiry: Evolution and Foundations of Ethics, Neumann University, Aston, PA, May 1-3, 2014

INVITED TALKS

- “Mental health and environment’, Romanell Centre Conference on Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Buffalo, July 2018
- “Health and Environment” *The 26th International Philosophy Olympiad*, Bar, Montenegro, 25-28 May, 2018
- “Sartre vs. Laing on Mental Illness” – PANTC Conference on Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, Buffalo, August 2, 2015
- “Sartre on Mental Illness” - PANTC Conference on Bioethics and the Philosophy of Medicine, Buffalo, August 2, 2014

WORKS IN PROGRESS

- Agency-based definitions of mental illness
- Adaptability and mental disorder

TEACHING EXPERIENCE (SOLE INSTRUCTOR)

- HUM 151 Introduction to Interdisciplinary Studies, WCSU, Spring 2017
- PHI 344 Existentialism, WCSU, Spring 2017
- PHI 233 Healthcare Ethics, WCSU, two sections, Spring 2017
- PHI 111 Healthcare Ethics, WCSU, Fall 2016
- HUM 198 Intro to Interdisciplinary Studies, WCSU, Fall 2016
- HUM 298 Madness and Civilization, WCSU, Fall 2016
- PHI 100 Intro to Philosophy First Year navigation course, WCSU, Fall 2016
- PHI 101 Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2012, University at Buffalo
- PHI 337 Social and Ethical Values in Medicine, Fall 2013, Spring 2014, University at Buffalo
- PHI 337 – Social and Ethical Values in Medicine, Summer 2014, University at Buffalo (online course)
- PHI 237 – Social and Ethical Values in Medicine, Fall 2014, University at Buffalo
- F14 - Medical Ethics, Fall 2014, Daemen College
- PHI 101 – Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2015, Daemen College

TEACHING EXPERIENCE (ASSISTANT INSTRUCTOR)

- World Civilizations, Fall 2010, Spring 2011, University at Buffalo
- Phi101: Introduction to Philosophy, Fall 2011, University at Buffalo
- Phi115: Critical Thinking, Spring 2012, University at Buffalo
- Phi337: Social and Ethical Values in Medicine, Spring 2012, University at Buffalo
- Phi237: Social and Ethical Values in Medicine, Spring 2015, University at Buffalo

TEACHING DEVELOPMENT

SUPERVISED TEACHING:

Introduction to Philosophy, supervised by W.B. Baumer, SUNY Buffalo, Fall 2012

COURSE:

Teaching Philosophy (PHI 604), taught by W.B. Baumer, SUNY Buffalo, Spring 2011

CONFERENCE/WORKSHOP

Target your Teaching, Teaching Assistant Conference, SUNY Buffalo , August 2010
Teaching first year courses, Danbury, CT 2016

COURSEWORK

- **Ethics and Political Philosophy**
Kant's Ethics: James Lawler, Spring 2012
Bioethics: David B. Hershenov, Fall 2012
Moral Psychology: James Beebe, Spring 2013
- **History of Philosophy**
Contemporary Philosophy: Kah Kyung Cho, Fall 2010
Aristotle: Jiyuan Yu, Spring 2011
Early Modern: James Lawler, Spring 2011
Nietzsche: Kaliop Nikolopoulou, Fall 2011
Simone De Beauvoir: Carolyn Korsmeyer, Spring 2012
Stoicism: Jiyuan Yu, Spring 2012
Independent Study on Baudrillard: James Lawler, Spring 2012
Plato: Jiyuan Yu, Spring 2013
- **Language, Logic, Metaphysics, and Philosophy of Science**
Independent Study on Sartre's *Being and Nothingness*: James Lawler, Fall 2010
Philosophy of Existence: Richard Cohen, Fall 2010
Metaphysical Foundations of Bioethics: David Hershenov, Fall 2011
Independent Study on Early Sartre: James Lawler, Fall 2012
Modal Logic: John Kearns, Spring 2013
- **Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind**
Contemporary Debates in Epistemology: James Beebe, Spring 2011

AWARDS

- Graduate Student Employee Union Professional Development Award, University at Buffalo, 2015
- Graduate Student Employee Union PhD Student Retention Award, University at Buffalo, Spring 2015
- Awarded a teaching assistantship for Ph. D. Studies at the University at Buffalo, 2014- 2015
- Awarded a teaching assistantship for Ph. D. Studies at the University at Buffalo, 2010-2014
- Awarded full tuition to attend University of Belgrade, 2000-2006
- Awarded full UWC scholarship to attend Red Cross Nordic UWC, 1998-2000

SERVICE TO PHILOSOPHY

- Plato's Academy North Tonawanda Campus (PANTC) - Philosophy of Medicine and Bioethics - Reading Group 2013- present
- Blameless Buffalo – Free Will and Responsibility – Reading Group
- Translation of philosophical texts from English to Serbian, 2007-2009

SERVICE TO UNIVERSITY

Volunteer for International Student Orientation Week, SUNY at Buffalo, August 15-22nd, 2014, 2015

LANGUAGES

English (fluent); Serbian/Montenegrin (native); intermediate level Russian and French (reading ability)

REFERENCES

JAMES LAWLER

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT: EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE NATURE OF MENTAL DISORDER

My dissertation provides an alternative understanding of mental disorder, one that incorporates the objective and scientific as well as the subjective and phenomenological aspects of mental disorder. My approach involves developing Sartre's view on mental disorder and applying it to current issues in psychiatry. The reason I use a Sartrean approach is that Sartre's view of physical and mental disorder is based on both illness - a subjective experience of a disorder, and disease - an objective and scientific aspect of a disorder. This is important for the following reason. Namely, history of psychiatry is marked by changes in models of mental disorders; the beginning of modern day psychiatry started with a biological model, which was replaced by psychoanalysis, only to return to the biological model, in particular Krapelin's. This shift in models provides evidence that there is a pull in two separate directions within psychiatry, one towards the neurological and biological concept of mental disorder, and another directed on understanding individual development and the meaning of symptoms within a patient's life. This pull saw its extreme form in the 1960's crisis, when the field came under attack from the critics, (who, though a diverse group, were labeled as anti-psychiatrists) who argued that psychiatry is a form of social control, that mental disorders are problems in living, not medical conditions, that schizophrenia is a sane response to an insane environment etc.

I argue that in trying to make psychiatry more scientific and immune to anti-psychiatric challenges, the emphasis is increasingly placed on the biological and neurological aspects of mental illness at the expense of phenomenological perspective of understanding mental illness in the experience of

conscious individuals. To develop a new approach, I set out to examine the medical model of mental illness and anti-psychiatric criticisms of this model (Chapters I and II). I argue that the anti-psychiatric critique is flawed as it cannot explain the symptoms of mental disorders as simply normal behavior in abnormal circumstances. This is because the intelligibility of certain behavior does not imply that such behavior is not caused by a mental disorder. When it comes to the medical model, I argue that it too is lacking in that we cannot on the basis of biology alone determine whether a certain condition is a mental disorder. Homosexuality is a case in point.

How do we then determine whether something qualifies as a mental disorder is the topic of Chapter III. There, I examine leading accounts of mental disorder, which I show to be lacking. The most dominant account is Jerome Wakefield's, according to which mental disorder is harmful dysfunction. Wakefield argues that humans have a species-typical design, which he claims is a product of evolution. This is problematic because of the difficulty in determining which functions of the human mind are the results of natural selection. For this reason, I argue that we should define mental disorder via mental health, i.e. determine which capacities we need to have in order to be able to function properly. I claim that these are: self-love (I assume here that the ability for self-love is necessary and sufficient for being able to love others), the ability to recognize of oneself as an agent with a purpose, and the epistemological ability to determine the truth about one's being-for-others.

Chapter IV elaborates on these capacities by showing that they are grounded in Sartre's ethics. I also sketch how Sartrean approach can deal with current problems in psychiatry. Namely, the latest edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders V invoked strong criticism for medicalizing human condition, which led The National Institute of Mental Health to withdraw its support due to lack of validity of proposed criteria. To illustrate, DSM 5 classifies grief as major depressive disorder. The problem of the medicalization of the human condition calls for demarcation criteria between mental disorders and normal human suffering. I argue that current problems in psychiatric diagnosis are not simply the result of lack of etiology but a lack of satisfactory understanding of a human being. I believe that we need to incorporate understanding of the patient's subjective experiences in order to avoid oversimplification and normalization.

Chapter IV explains the basic tenets of existential psychoanalysis as sketched by Sartre. This psychoanalysis is meant to illuminate the subjective experience involved in mental disorders. I use Schreber's case in order to accomplish this, which I then contrast to Freud's interpretation of this case to further elaborate on the differences between the two approaches as well as to point out the strengths of Sartrean approach.

Finally, I use Sartre's early work to show how phenomenology can help us understand delusions. Specifically, I argue that the debate as to whether delusions are beliefs or not is wrongly framed. This is because, rather than establishing the belief status of delusions, we need to ascertain whether delusions involve perception or imagination. Sartre's view is that delusions involve an imaginary attitude. I show then, by looking at our attitudes while watching a play, that this explanation can account for why delusions are rarely acted on and why they are resistant to counterevidence.